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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we use a Downsian spatial model to explain the 
political motivation behind the choice of Marxist/Leninist ideology 
by a number of non-communist leftist parties in the Arab nationalist 
movement. We assume that the attempts of these parties to distinguish 
their position from the strict M/L position generates perceptual 
ambiguities in the minds of the people. Given our assumptions about 
citizen utility functions, we derive the result that leftist parties 
gains supporters as they move towards the M/L position. 
Acknowledgement: We wish to thank Roger Faith and Gordon Tullick for 
their helpful comments. 
Introduction 
A SPATIAL MODEL OF LEFTIST 
IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS IN ARAB POLITICS 
2 
In this'paper, a formal model of the political motiv,tibn behind
the choice of Marxism/Leninism ideology by a number of non-cominunist 
leftist partie• in the Arab world i• pre•�ted. Thi• e�e1•ibn tu 
Marxism has occurred in many political parties throughout tlie �rab world,
including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine l cPl.F.L.P.) 
and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (D.F.LJP.D in the
Palestinian Arab movement, the National Front for the Liberlt�on of. 
 South Yemen (N.F.L.Y.), the Popular Front for the Liberation df Oman 
 (P.F.L.O.) [16], the Popular Front for the Liberation of West�rn Sahara, 
formerly Spanish Sahara (POLISARIO), as well as scores of ltssler politi­
.cal parties and movements in Lebanon and the Arab east. Ali!. ¢hese par-:
ti.,, together with the Arab Baath Sueiali•t Party, the Uni� l uf Popul•r 
Forces in Morocco, the original Arab Socialist Union of EgyrtJ(which has
significantly changed since Nasser's death) may be identifJedlas leftist
according ·to the criteria presented in the next section. 
Consider the P.F.L.P. as an example of the group th!atlshifted 
to Marxism-Leninism. The P.F.L.P. grew out of the Arab NaJionalist 
movement, whose transformation to Marxism-Leninism (M-L) isl' s�riking [9,
14, 15]. The initial structure and ideas of this movement 1 ete not 
left of the center by any local or external standards. 1 Most of the
cadre and leadership were people with property who did not reject their 
background [141. The movement's goals (unity, liberation and retri-
bution) were broad enough to make everybody from the extreme right to 
the extreme left eligible for membership [9, 14, 15). Yet, despite the 
party's early nationalist heritage and its initial hostility towards 
the Communists and Baathists -- indeed, toward all socialist ideas [15] 
it took less than six years [9] for the party's leadership and cadre 
to transform to the Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
To distinguish their position from the traditional Arab Com-
munists, they point out the Communists do not comprehend that "the 
analysis which Marxism gave to a particular situation at certain times 
cannot be the same for the new situation which has been developed from 
the previous one.'' [9] Thus, the P.F.L. f. political strategy stress 
their convictions that: 
111. The Modern Capitalism is different from what it was during
Marx's days . 
2. The class structure in underdeveloped societies are different
from that in an Industrial society which Marx tackled. 
3. Nationalism, which was used by the European Bourgeoisie
during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries for conquest 
and exploitations, has acquired a revolutionary, progressive 
content in the third world. It became the framework of their 
struggle against Imperialism, which is the highest stage 
of Capitalism. " 
These are the basic arguments with which the P.F. L.P. hopes to distin-
guish their position from the Arab Communists. They summarize the dis-
tinction as follows [9]: 
1on this the P. F. L.P. strategy [9] states that "the political organ­
ization of the P. F.L.P. is a continuation of the Arab nationalist move­
ment which has a petit-bourgeoise structure and content. " 
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"The Arab Communist parties were only committed to Marixism­
Leninism superficially, hence were incapable of �eading ttie 
revolution in our country. They either understood the thJor
in a static, lifeless manner, or implemented it mechanically
without due analysis to its local contact. "2 
 In order to relate their views to traditional Marxism, 
I P.F.L.P. points out that "what is essential and immortal in M r
I is the dialectical way in which all problems are analyzed -- fh 
tics of continuous change and movement • • • •  " Hence, the P. F.L [P 
e 
ism 
dialec-
agrees 
with the Marxist method of analysis, but tries to escape some/ of the 
historic predictions and specifics of the theory. 
The adoption by the P.F.L.P. of Marxism-Leninism as the/core of 
their ideology was not an isolated event. In June 1968, the fN.f .L.Y. , 
the movement which shared in the struggle against the British iµ Aden,
shook off the historical leadership of Al-Shaabi to adopt Ma�ism-
Leninism [16]. I A series of questions arise. Did these parties shif uositions 
because Marxist-Leninist ideology captured the imagination oi rlhe Arab
masses? How could the strong leadership of N.F.L.Y. lose thei 
ideological grip on the rank and file of their party so swifbl�. and
after that leadership had achieved a resounding victory over/ tlie British? 
One fact is certain: the standard bearers of Marxis[' ieninism 
in the Arab world, the Communist parties, did not make any si1gnificant 
in-road in contemporary Arab politics [7, 9, 13], nor did t�ey/at any 
time have a chance of building a stable presence inside any !Arab 
2The researchers failed to find any adequate exposi i�n of the 
P.F. L.P. 's new theoretical contributions beyond what is alrra y men­
tioned. For example, the role of nationalism and the "organi " rela­
tionship between class and national struggle has been develpp d by the
Baathists a quarter of a century before the 1967 P.F. L.P. 's l C ngress. 
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government even though they were the oldest organized party of the 
left. 3 An explanation of the shift towards Marxism-Leninism by the
P. F. L.P. and others must be sought outside the example set by the 
Arab Communists. 
On Ideology in Arab Context 
In this section, the importance of ideology and what it means 
in contemporary Arab politics will be pointed out. 
In his book on revolutionary Arab ideology [l], Dr. Elias 
Farah4 gave the following interpretation to the concept of ideology:
"The ideology is a system of ideas with a concrete purpose; 
it is a collection of ideas about the world, life, and society 
which together form the basis of collective action • • • •  Thus, 
we can distinguish between religious, nationalistic, democratic, 
bourgeoisie, socialist and communist ideologies • • • •  The ideo­
logy is a social condition for any renaissance, that is because 
it helps to describe the total picture of society and in parti­
cular specify the relationship between what .is special and 
temporary in the society and what is general for all humanity. " 
More critically, he observes that: 
a) Modern societies are ideological.
b) Ideology is a "must" to guide change.
c) No revolutionary party is without an ideological commitment.
3The P .F . L. P. states that "the traditional Communist parties in
the Arab world failed because of their structure and mistaken strate­
gies . • • •  " P. 130-140 [9]. 
4Dr. E. Farah is a member of the National Command of Arab Baath 
Socialist Party. The extract is from the Arabic text. (5th ed. , 1975, 
pages 10, 11.) 
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It is on these sets of ideas that "almost" all the Arab 
on the left agree, and it is on these observations a serious bt
ideological choice in Arab context should be based. On the slam
the P. F. L. P. political and organizational strategy [9] statJs: 
"The foundation of a revolutionary party is a revoluJio 
ideology; without it, the party cannot be but a group mo�in
instinctively or under the influence of events. The revolu 
tionary ideology is that which deals with all aspects of Ima 
and society in the relevant time." 
These convictions are shared by a large number of Arab . 
I intellectuals outside the organized parties.5 Indeed, the cons
that no serious party could be without an elaborate and comple 
parties 
dy of 
theme, 
ary 
nsus 
e ideo-
I logical structure is shared even by many parties on the righf 'uch as
the Moslem Brotherhood and El-Tahrir. In their writings, the 
of these parties go to great lengths to show that their ideb1
I Islam, answers unambiguously all the questions that modern ide 
aders 
try to answer [22, 23]. In fact, the conviction that a well! d4veloped 
ideology is an absolute necessity for any meaningful social,! eeonomic 
and cultural development can be traced to the heritage of Isl a Islam 
:: ::::l:�: :e::�:e:: :::c::t:::i:::::n::dt:�::::ed�:r:J:::n:to:s 
6 the Islamic state [21-27]. 
5see Klofis Makhsood, The Crises of Arab Left, Arabic �ext, 
First edition [171, Self Criticism After Defeat, S. J. Al-A1Adh'n, 
Criticism of Religious Ideology [34]. Arabic Texts, First tldi ions,
and N. Alwash in [36]. I 6see, for example, M. Aflag, On Memory of the Arab frqphet, 
and The Baath and Heritage [5]. 
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Some revolutionary Arabs credit the early successes of Islam 
to the comprehensiveness and completeness of its ideological structure. 
[33, 341. Because of the completeness of his traditional ideology, 
Islam, the active Arab individual demands a similar level of completeness 
before considering any new, competing alternative. 
The Left in Arab Context 
A particular party will be identified as leftists if the 
following subjective and objective factors are present: 7 
1) Subjectively, if the relevant party identifies itself 
publicly as being leftist. 
2) Objectively, if: 
a) · other Arab parties recognize it as leftist, 
b) there is an international recognition of this claim, 
c) the party manifesto limits, to various degrees, private 
ownership and the role of the market. 
The most important objective criteria for identification is (c). 
This factor actually is a composite one, for it involves a measure of 
attitude toward religion and the organization of the state. 
Islam, the dominant religion.of the Arab world, is not only 
a set of rules to regulate a relationship with God, but also a system 
of government. It describes the role of an Islamic government, the 
bas.ic tax system, economic classes, and the relationship between 
7see, for example, On Revolutionary Arab Politics Before and 
After Defeat. [3] 
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individuals and government.8 Hence, a party position for pub!li• 
ownership which deviates from the widest interpretations of the 
teaching of Islam reflects a rejection of the role of religiol 
guiding the state. 
n 
Thus, it seems that (c) encompasses the two most impQrtant 
objectives of the Arab left: limited private ownership, and !restriction 
of the role of religion in state affairs. 
Conventional Explanations 
for Ideological Choices 
It is difficult to disentagle, in the plethora of artidles and 
papers dealing with Arab politics, those elements which dealip�imarily 
with ideological choice. Some terms have been so much abuse as to 
cause much confusion. Such terms as "radicals" have been asf odiated 
exclusively with the "leftists." Radicalism in the Arab world lis asso-
. I ciated with issues, not ideologies. It is possible for an individual to
be radical on a political issue without being in the slighte�tJway 
socialistic, and vise versa. -Arab Communists have been the I least 
radical on the Arab-Israel issue, and Fatah, the largest Palisttinian 
Arab movement, has no particular allegiance to socialist idea1a. Such 
confusion about terms leads to serious errors in analysis oflAtab 
politics. 
8see, for example, Our Philosophy, M. El-Sader, first dition, 
Arabic text [211; Mr. Yousif, The Contrived Ga Between Scidnc and 
Religion [241, p. 1-10; Said Kotib, Islam and the Problems df ivi­
lization [22), p. 164-168; Mr. Khallaf-Allah, "The Koran and S cialism," 
in Il- Katib, July 1966; D. Saab H., Islam Facin the Challerl e of 
Modern Life, [231, p. 20-25; Y. Al-Milaiji, Consultation in lis 
Versus Its Role in the Western Democracies and Marxism [26li 
Al- Khatib, The Financial Policies in Islam [25]. 
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Therefore, rather than documenting the traditional scholarly 
literature dealing with Arab ideological choices, two conventional 
explanations will be outlined and an informational version of our 
theory will be presented. 
Leadership Transformation Theory 
This is the oldest and most traditional explanation of ideo-
logical shifts by third world parties. Leaders are sovereign. They 
perceive the "common good" of society in a particular way at certain 
stages of their lives and experiences and adopt a certain ideology. 
Their ideological position changes to the left or the right through 
further personal experiences.9 According to this theory, George Hahbash 
and the group leadership in the P.F.L.P. would have had to undergo an 
ideological transformation from the right to the left, then have 
influenced the cadre and supporters to follow suit. 
The support for this theory, however, is not limited to the 
traditionalists. The revolutionary factionlO of the P.F.L.P. asserts 
that [14] "the basic lesson from the Cuban experience is that when the 
elements in control of the leadership of a particular petit-bourgeoise 
9Almost all articles dealing with "Nasser" ideology fall in 
this category. 
10rhis faction had seceded from the P.F.L.P. in March, 1972. 
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movement have the ability of transformation to Marxism-Leninismj then 
the possibility of transformation of the whole movement is thlr 1111 
They go on to assert that "the existence of Marxist-Leninist l1ements in 
a potit-b�rgodi•• �g�i�tion is �t the important factor ir trans­
forming the whole organization, but it's the position and effrc¢ivity of 
those elements in the leadership that are vital." 
The reasons that are usually given for an ideological s�if t by 
a leader, such as personal experience, leadership ego, or other 1 psy­
chological factors, are unconvincing. The theory leaves unajswered the 
question of why the followers went along with the leader. 
Outside Pressures 
This theory states that the parties have no independentlideo­
logi�l choice. PartiM adopt variouo pooition• on politica� ilo•�• 
(e.g., the Palestinians, oil, West-East orientation, etc.) as al result 
of forcM largely outsido th• �ntrol of tho political party 1 [lbuo, tho 
more external force applied on the parties to be "radical" 01 these 
issues, the greater will be the shift to the left. For exam,le1, a 
conflict between a less desirable Western policy and a more 1eslrable 
Soviet policy.in the Arab world would make Hahbash a staunch Ma�xist­
Leninist, and thus transform the whole P.F.L.P. Another exall).ple is the 
11see [4], p. 29. In fact, this faction even denies Ith 
sincerity of the P.F.L.P. adoption of Marxism/Leninism. Theyl s 
[14] , p. 34, that "the official adoption of Marxism/Leni.nism do 
mean that the P.F.L.P. possesses the necessary conditions fo1 t 
formation. For history taught us -- as Lenin mentioned -- t�ati 
enemies of Marxism fail to fight it on an open ground, they �r 
fight it from inside by adopting it superficially. All thosT 
inside the P.F.L.P. and are acquainted with its leadership can 
doubt the earnestness of the transformation." 
ate in 
s not 
e trans­
when the 
apt to 
o lived 
t but 
10 
account of Nasser's policies related by M. Haiykel in his book, Abdul 
Nasser and the World. He portrays Nasser's drift to the left as a 
reaction to the West's unwillingness to finance the high dam. This 
theory asserts that the ideological shift is a choice, but it is a 
forced one. 
A variant of this theory is what can be termed "the conspiracy 
theory." Here, international forces conspire to form and aid various 
factions in the party and force a change in leadership by either 
deposing them physically or usurping their real power over the faction 
loyal to their ideology.12 It cannot be denied that super-power 
policies have appreciable effect on creating issues and affecting the 
position which various Arab parties assume,13 but the political and 
ideological conflicts in the Arab world are driven mainly by Arab 
aspirations. The final results of outside efforts can be very different 
from ¥hat was originally intended.14 
The 1967 document, in which the P. F.L.P. declares the adoption 
of Marxism-Leninism, criticizes the general Soviet policy in the Middle 
East, particularly in the case of Palestine. Later, the Movement 
12Laqueur, N., "Russia Enters the Middle East." Foreign Affairs, 
January 1969: [31]. 
13Foreign Affairs, July 1957, "Strategy of the Middle East," 
[32]' p. 661. 
14The Soviet policy is seen by the rejection front (the Baath 
and the P.F. L.P.) as being too moderate towards Israel. Essentially, 
Soviet policy has no squabble with the legitimacy of its existence, 
only with its "imperialist connection" and its ultra-religious/nation­
alist character. In fact, the Soviets offered their own guarantee to 
the security of 1967 borders of Israel. 
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criticizes Chinese policy in the Arabian Gulf. 15 These obser�ations 
discredit the one-directional coupling tµeory: 
Choice of 
Issue 
Position 
...... 7 Choice of Ideology 
The conspiracy version can only explain short-<term,.plienomena. 
such as temporary shifts of position on certain issues, but Jotl a 
I 
radical, long-term ideological shift. The P. F.L.P. leadership bas not 
I
been changed by outside power, but has itself undergone an iqeo�ogical 
shift. 
A Theory of the Leftward Shift 
licts to The ritual of applying lessons from European class crn 
the economic, social, national, and religious conflicts in the lArab world 
has a rational basis. Those who are successful in projectin� 
priate images can hope to obtain useful international socialls
munist support in the conflicts with their opponents, or at �e 
he appro-
or com-
st to 
diffuse leftist support of their opponents. On the far left[, the Marxist-
Leninist ideology, which has been developed and refined over decades of 
conflicts with democrats, socialists, anarchists , and 
capitalists, offers a politicized individual an apparently co 
I modern world view as a substitute for an old religious therl 
no longer is satisfying. In developing Arab countries, mary �eople 
raised in a traditional society become frustrated and anxiors lin the 
proce•• of adapting to �de� urban eociecy. Similar P"1Cbrlqgical 
and 
, in an effort to outbid the Soviet po1i in theMiddle East, recognized what they called the "legitimate" int est of 
the Shah in the Arabian Gulf, according to the official ver�io of the 
talk• between the Chineee prime miniet� the Shah in Tehrani 1974. 
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pressures are faced by Europeans who change from a static, traditional 
social s tructure to a more dynamic, technological, and urban society. 
It is here argued that many politically active Arabs prefer a political 
party that seems to clearly define its economic and social consequences 
to a party that might offer them greater benefits, but with risks 
stemming from non-clarity. In other words, risk-averse individuals 
participating in a risky political struggle pref er a less desirable but 
certain outcome to a more desirable uncertain outcome, If, in addition, 
the Marxist-Leninist positions appear to be more certain than other 
leftist party positions in Arab politics, then it will be demonstrated 
that the risk aversion assumption causes the leftward shift already 
discussed. 
In particular, it can be theorized that a rational actor (party) 
would maximize political support, measured by enrollment in the party. 
However, it can be argued that maximizing membership is only a derivative 
objective and that the real objective is assuming power. For example, 
infiltrating the Army and police, assassination, and factional elitist 
politics have been a central part of the struggle for power on many 
occasions. 
While this argument cannot be disre,gardeg, it. is.true that all 
these methods of assuming power are the final act of a long process of 
popular education and psychological preparation of the masses against 
the incumbent regime by the organized revolutionary parties. The 
highest form of this preparation is enrollment in the revolutionary 
party itself. All Arab leftist parties argue that no stable 
revolutionary change of government can be affected without wide and 
13 
solid support.16 The P .F .L.P. political and organizational sltr
.
regy 
states: "Working with the masses, caring about its problems an 
helping solve these problems, organizing and leading the masses/is our 
first and paramount task. The masses are the reason behind durl exis­
tence. It is the only way to mobilize the revolutionary potJnti 
I achieve our goals.1117 It goes on to say that "any gap between and the 
masses is a dangerous signal to our own existence. " 1 On the same theme, M. Aflag writes, "The masses are hEj greatest 
I force and the only insurance of achieving the goals of Arab revo-
1 lution.1118 He also asserts that, "The masses are the final leJJerence, 
the masses are now, more than any time before, the fermenter ot revo­
lution and history peacemaker." 
These convictions are not merely ideological, they �re/prag­
macic. The oontinuo� failure of military regime• in the A+b / world, 
star�in� with El-Zaim and Shishakely in Syria, and continuinl with 
Kassim in Iraq, Nasser in Egypt and Jadid in Syria, are obvi.ou 
examples for changes which fail to have the prerequisite of la revolution-
ary, solid grass roots support among the Arab masses. ThusJ tile choice 
I . xample, analysis for the collapse of the B athist's
8th of February revolution in Iraq 196 3, in M. Aflag, The Prli t of 
Commencement· [6 ]. · 
17see [9], page 10 1. 
18see [61, page 183. 
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of party enrollment as an objective for a rational leftist party is 
reasonable in terms of the nature of Arab society. 
It is also postulated that individuals have specific preferences 
for ideological positions. These preferences reflect class and family 
background, formal and informal education, and social association. The 
individual will enroll or support the party that: 
1) offers an ideological structure nearest to personal 
position, 
2) offers the most complete ideological structure. 
Parties are hampered from ascertaining the distribution of the 
preferences among the population by sampling or polling due to obvious 
political and institutional constraint, even when they assume power. 
Also, for a long time after·a revolutionary change, the psychological 
drag of the previous regimes will distort individual preferences. 
Yet, in spite of their incomplete knowledge of the distribution 
of preferences in the population, leftist parties have to take posi-
tions on a variety of ideological and political issues as they face the 
challenges of day-to-day political events. In a way, this exercise can 
be viewed as a trial-and-error procedure that increases their knowledge 
about the underlying distribution of preferences. The results will be 
evaluated through their effects on enrollment. 
15 
Thus, in this theory, it is essential for any viable j:p4rty to
have as complete an ideological structure as possible, in orae for  
:::
h
.::�:::::� :: ::,::::.
'
:.:�:::.�:h:�: ::�::::-�·�: ent to tions of 
the type which Islam, the traditional ideology, sought to answ r. 19 
These are precisely the questions to which Marxism-Lenin�sm 
give central importance. Therefore, the rational party in rihi� model 
seeks to maximize its enrollment while facing the following lde�isional 
cost structure. 
1) A penalty cost of incompleteness of its ideological 
structure. 
2) Information and organizational cost of developiµg 
articulating and communicating its ideology. 
The choice is conducted within the following informational environment: 
1) The true preference distribution of the populat[[ od is 
uncertain. 
2) Marxism-Leninism is an apparently tried and we]l-
::::
::�
::
d 
,:::·::,:::.:• .:·:�:.::1:1:f:: ::rti-
cular party entails negligible informational.and prganiza-
tional cost.  
3) In the Arab world, the position of Marxism-Lenin�sm (x*) is 
to the left of the preferred positions of most / pepple on the 
1%uch questions as why and how society changes, t�o�ght and 
matter dialectics. 
16 
ideological axis. 20 See Figure 1. 
Proportion of 
Population 
_..- 1 Ideology 
x* x 0 
Left 
Figure 1 
---?> Right 
The model which is developed in the next section shows how a 
rational party will move toward Marxism-Leninism in its own ideology. 21· 
The document published by the National Leadership of the Baath 
Party [7] seems to support this theory. It states: 
"The Baath always believed that scientific social discoveries 
come only through effort to analyze the situat.ion and discover 
facts • • • •  This attitude has always exposed those who adopted 
other revolutionary ideologies, particularly the Marxist-Leninist, 
as ready-made framework because of laziness and incapability."22 
20on this, the P.F.L.P. strategy [9] states that "The present 
popular ideology among the masses are to the right of our position." 
p. 19. 
21Another explanation that can be loosely termed rational choice 
of the main phenomenon addressed by this paper, is that advanced by R. 
Wesson in, Why Marxism? The Continuing Success of a Failed Theory. N.Y. 
1976. The gist of his argument is that Marxism is adopted becaus
e it 
can he made to serve the needs of diverse nrotest qrouns and radical 
movements. However, his analysis is mainly concerned with Western 
groups and movements. 
22There is an interesting footnote on the same page. It states: 
"The behavior of those who adopted Marxism-Leninism without due analysis 
to the local conditions and the socio-historical context of the current 
stage can be termed scientific surrender • • • •  This means that such 
17 
The Model 
The spatial model about to be introduced is an extensiof of the 
unidimensional spatial model of party c�mpetition exposited Jy howns.23 
Suppose that all Arab political elites conceptualize the speJtrlun of 
. I left parties as points on a single ideological dimension. Let 
I
denote the position of party j as perceived by individual i {i 
N and j = 1, . • .  , p) , where N denotes the number of elites aJd 
I denotes the number of parties on the left.24 
1, ... 
In order to dele 
specific results which illuminate the phenomenon under discuss:ijon, it 
I 
adoption is a result of cultural and ideological bankruptcy.'!' �On the 
same theme in [2], p. 7, Dr. Farah wrote, "There is an essen i 1 differ­
ence between adopting an ideology as a result of deep belief a d convic­
tion and adopting it because of competition for followers an1 up­porters . • • •  It is said that a great deal of socialist ideals re adop­
ted because of the latter factor, not because of deep convicti n or 
belief." 
23The unidimensional spatial model was introduced in o
J
the 
political science literature by Downs (39]. The social choife theory
for the unidimensional case was developed by Black [40]. Dayi and
Hinich !411 extended and developed spatial models for two part elec­
toral competition; see Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook [42]. 
24Allowing each citizen to have a different perceptipn l of each 
party position is an extension from traditional spatial mode�s 
Shepsle [43] introduced candidate uncertainty into spatial mpd�ls, but 
oes not 
m Shepsle 
nd the 
he assumed that the uncertainty term for party j in his mode� 
depend on the policy positions of the jth party. We differ fr by assuming a relationship between the perceptual uncertaintr 
party position, and by using a different type of multiparty �o$petition. 
18 
is necessary to use a special form for indiyidual utility functions. 
Suppose that all individuals have quadratic utility functions 
for party positions, i.e., let 
2 u( 6ij' xi) = Ci
- aik ( 6ij - Xi)
represent the utility which individual i receives if the position 
is adopted. The term xi is individual i
1s ideal point; ci is a constant 
which will play no role in our results; and aik is a positive constant
which is a function of the positions of the other parties, but is 
independent of eij; e.g., when p = 3, ail depends only on ei2 and ei3'
and ai3 depends only on eil and ei2• The quadratic utility function is
the simplest model that incorporates risk aversion.25
In keeping with the· game theoretic orientation of spatial 
theory, suppose that the parties are willing to alter their positions in 
order to increase their political power and hence their chances of 
implementing their program. In terms of this model, suppose that the 
-1 N average perceived position of the jth party 6j = N ri=l 6ij
is determined 
by the positions that the party advocates. The party can alter its 
average position in the population by changing its platform, but there 
will still �e a diversity of individual perceptions. 
As an important additional assumption, suppose that parties do 
not coordinate their platforms. Occasionally, several parties form a 
coalition against others, but the competition for supporters is fierce 
and very non-cooperative. This is in fact a correct observation about 
leftist parties all over the world. 
2�ee pp. 75-76 of Riker and Ordeshook (44], and Shepsle (43].
19 
The parties choose their positions in our model to maxi.ihize 
their pnlitioal auppnrt �ng the effeotive part nf the pupu�at,nn, and 
for this reason need to know the preferences of the cadre. �hejlanguage 
u•ed by Dn�• and in the fn�l thenriea of �ting, ou�ey• 1hel jmpr�­
sion that the results require the assumption that the candidate� (or
. I parties) know the distribution of ideal points; but for the med[an voter 
result for two candidates, each candidate need only know the lmcllian 
ideal point in order to guarantee at least a tie. For electio 
I more than two candidates, however, the form of the ideal point 
I bution determines the play of the game. This perfect informat 
. I assumption for candidates has been made to facilitate the theo�izing, 
I but it is obvious that it is impossible to know the preferences of a 
large, heterogeneous political body, and it is difficult to lveln obtain
I a precise estimate of the median position using the type of su?jvey data
and methods that are available in the West. In order to modll !the 
uncertainty about preferences, assume that the population ofl N /political 
individuals is a random sample from an infinite population whole statis­
tical parameters are imperfectly known by the parties. Thisl t ick is
commonly used by statisticians. For example, the average pol' i 
-1 N party j, .ej = N ri=l eij 
is a random variable. By the Centr 
Theorem (assuming finite variance), the difference between e� 
 I given group �nd µj' the mean of the infinite population, is rp
imately l//N for large N. Thus, µ. can be estimated withi� a J 
ion of 
1 Limit 
or a 
rox-
accuracy 
of l//N* by taking a random sample of the N individuals whol themselves 
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are a representative sample from the unobservable infinite population.26 
Suppose that the amount of time, money, and energy which indivi­
dual i contributes is proportional to u(0ij
'xi)' and that the party 's
political pewer is the sum of the resources contributed by the cadre to 
that party, Thep party j. Jii;iXimizes the expected value of its political 
power by choosing 
27 the population. 
a position e
j 
which maximizes the average utility in 
Let £ij 
; 0ij 
- 0
j 
denote idiosyncratic perceptual 
error of the jth party's position, and let oj
2 denote the variance of£ .. iJ 
in the population. By straightforward algebraic manipulation, the 
average individual utility for party j is 
2 2 
--- ---2 c - aik (0j + oj) + 2aikxi ej - aik xi • 
where the overbars denote mean values. 
(2) 
As the special feature of this model, assume that a: is a non­J 
decreasing function of e
j
. i.e., the slope of do�/d0
j 
is positive, and 
26when N is large, the difference between 0j 
and µ
j
is negli­
gible. For a formal statement of the relationship between sample sta­
tistics and population parameters, the reader should consult any stand­
ard mathematical statistics books; e�g., Sections 7.5 and 7.6 of �dd 
and Graybill [46]. 
27This is due to the fact that the average of the sum of the 
utilities is the sum of the average utility. To be formally correct, 
the terms "expected" and "average" refer to mean values in the infinite 
population, but when N is large, there is no practical distinction be­
tween these mean values and averages over the set of N individuals. 
Thus, e
j 
is used in this paper instead of µ
j 
in order to reduce the 
notational complexity as much as possible. We will also use x to denote 
the populatipn mean ideal point. These distinctions will be confusing 
for readers who regularly use sample averages as if they were true 
population parameters, but a note is made here of the distinction as a 
modest concession to mathematical rigor. 
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thus the variance of the perceptual error decreases as e
j 
movesl to the 
left. Recall that the Marxist-Leninist position was assumed /to
i
l anchor 
the left of the ideology dimensions; thus, the assumption on a� implies J 
that the M/L position has the smallest variance. 
As an additional modest assumption, suppose that a:
J 
strictly convex function of e
j
, i.e., its second derivative ositive. 
It is then clear from (2)- that the average utility, and thus 
expected power of party j, is a concave function of 0j 
(j; 1, , • • •  , p). .  As long as e1, • . •  , ep are restricted to some common interval, the con-
cavity of the party objeative functions (their expected power)jimplies 
that there �i•ta a Na•h equilibri�,.mi� wa denota a; , ··l· a; 28 
This means that if party j chooses 0
j 
+ 0
j
' but all the othe
r 
arties 
choose their equil
:
brium positions, then party j's utility ir less than 
if it had chosen e
j
, i.e., once the parties are at the equilib
J
ium, 
there is no incentive for one party to make a unilateral mov
r
· 9 
The property of an equilibrium that we wish to exploit lis as 
follows: * * any equilibrium set e
j
, • • •• ep of party positionslmdst 
satisfy the first order conditions 
e* cJcrj
2 
j 
+ 
d0
j 
aikxi 
aik 
(3) 
2%ee Hinich, Ledyard, and Ordeshook [45]. The non-j'co4jlperative 
assumption is important here. 
2\there may be many equilibria. In order to obtain 1atnique equilibrium, we would have to restrict the form of a ik' For e ample, there is a unique equilibrium if a ik is independent of the �a ty posi­tions. 
22 
for each j c 1, . • .  , p. In order to simplify the exposition, restrict 
2 attention to the special case when rb./d6. c a, a constant, and the a.,. J J 1� 
are independent of the other party positions. Then (3) becomes 
where 
e. J 
0. 
k 
o. - a 
k 
"' aikxi 
aik
(4) 
is independent of the party position. Consequently, the equilibrium 
defined by (4) is unique. As a. the slope of the relation between a� 
and e
j
, increases the party's move to the left. If in the course of 
party competition the variance of the other parties increases relative 
to the variance of the Marxist-Leninist position, then � increases. 
The other parties then move to the left in order to increase their 
power. See Appendix for a clarifying example. 
The interpretation of this result in the Arab context is this. 
Suppose that the variance of the party positions in the population is 
the same for all parties at the initial stages of political sociali-
zation of the proto-elites. As these politically active individuals 
become more aware of the ideological positions of the parties, suppose 
that the Marxist-Leninist position appears to be more certain than 
any other left position. Moreover, suppose that the variance of a 
party decreases as it adopts Marxist-Len�nist policies, but the relative 
variance increases as individuals compare 'the parties. In terms of this
model, this means that S increases over time. If, on the other hand, the 
variances of the parties decrease (or increase at the same rate) then 
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S remains constant. It is here argued that competition betw
J
enl Arab 
left parties results in a leftward shift toward the Marxist-1eninist 
position as a result of a perceived increase in the variance
.
lof/the 
other parties relative to the Marxist-Leninist position by ttie elites. 
This increase is due in part to the increasing articulation 1'f the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology made possible by a variety of rele anlt new 
Communist experiences, such as the Cuban, Vietnamese, and weJteirn 
Communist parties, coupled with the increasing resources devlt�d by 
the Chinese and the Russians to clarify the ideological issuls !through 
which they project theit ot�ggle. On the othet haod, ooly �4gce 
resources a re devoted by the third world countries to classi,y lthe 
ideology of their societies in the ever-increasing complexitY of the 
modern world. 
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Appendix 
In order to illuminate the formal reasoning behind our result, 
consider the following example. Suppose that all politically active 
individuals in a village have identical ideal positions that they are 
unable to articulate. Assume that this position is to the right of the 
M-L position, and involves compromises between M-L interpretations and 
traditional positions on social and economic issues. Since the origin 
and unit of the space are arbitrary, set the M-L position at � and 
let x = 1 be the ideal position of the politicized villagers, 
Assume that two parties are competing for support in the village. 
One party adopts the M-L position, while the other articulates a program 
that it hopes to be perceived at the village position. Due to the 
ambiguities and confusions inherent in a compromise between Marxism and 
traditional concepts of property rights and the like, each villager 
perceives the party to be at Si = l + ei. The term Ei is an idiosyncratic 
distortion of the party's ideological position. Assume that the variation 
of the ei in the village is modeled by a normal distribution with mean 
zero and variance .2!!.£· As can easily be seen from a table of the no.rmal 
distribution 15.9 percent pf the village perceive the "compromise" party 
to be to the left of the M-L = 0 (Figure 2). These individuals prefer 
the M-L party since it is closer to their ideal (x=l). Only 68.2 percent 
pref�r the ''compromise." 
Suppose the "compromise" party moves to the left and adopts 
the position e = 1/2. Assume that as a result of moving towards the 
M-L position, the standard deviation of e is reduced to the value 1/4. 
i 
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Then only 2.3 percent of the village perceive the party to be Ito 
the left of zero. Another 2.3 percent perceive the party to be �o 
2 the right of 6 + 4 "'1, and thus they prefer the M-L party. Moslt 
(95.4 percent) prefer the party at 9 = 1/2 to the M-L party. 
I 
I
l 
J. 
I I I ' 
u;-<1 ! I I 6"·'1 "'--- 19. 
M-L:::o I I L :2. 2. 
Normal Distribution of Perceived Positions 
of Leftist Party. 
Figure 2 
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